Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC
On August 9, 2011, the Lawyers Committee joined seven other civil rights organizations in filing a friend-of-the-court brief in the Supreme Court case of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC, No. 10-553. The brief argues that the First Amendment does not require excluding parochial school teachers from the protections of the important civil rights statutes that prohibit discrimination in employment and that prohibit retaliation for opposing discrimination. Civil rights laws serve a compelling government interest. Protecting parochial school teachers through civil rights statutes does not implicate the Constitution’s protection of religious belief, does not regulate the content of religious doctrine, does not resolve questions of faith, and does not seek to bestow religious authority on particular individuals.
Cheryl Perich taught kindergarten, then fourth grade classes at the Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Church School from 1999 through 2004. While most of her duties involved teaching secular subjects, she also taught daily religion classes and led students in prayer. Ms. Perich was called a “commissioned minister,” but the religious duties of all teachers, including those who were not members of the Lutheran church, were the same as those of the “commissioned ministers.” Ms. Perich went on disability leave for the 2004-05 school year. When Ms. Perich tried to return from her leave, the school asked her to resign, instead. She refused to resign and advised that if the school declined to reinstate her, she would file a discrimination claim. The school terminated her employment. She filed a complaint with EEOC for disability discrimination and retaliation. The EEOC filed a case on her behalf based on retaliation for asserting her rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The school claimed that the First Amendment bars courts from hearing anti-discrimination suits brought by “ministerial” employees against religious organizations, and the district court agreed. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The school appealed to the Supreme Court. Dozens of religious organizations have joined amicus briefs arguing that the First Amendment grants broad exceptions to the enforcement of civil rights laws.
The brief points out that civil rights statutes regulate the school’s commercial conduct in employing teachers to perform educational services that are constitutionally subject to extensive governmental regulation. Even where the law burdens religious practice, the court must also weigh the government’s countervailing interest in deciding whether an exemption should be granted. Anti-retaliation provisions are important to effective enforcement of a broad range of statutes. The Government has a compelling interest in preventing retaliation against employees who report unlawful conduct (e.g., child abuse) or cooperate in enforcement proceedings.h3The school offers no rationale that would allow retaliation in this case but protect those reporting other violations of law. Congress has the power to protect parochial school employees who have been subjected to wrongful discrimination, subject only to the narrowest exceptions necessary to protect the autonomy of religious institutions in matters of governance and doctrine.
While this case concerns parochial school teachers, it will potentially affect the rights of many employees of religiously affiliated organizations. To read the brief filed by the Lawyers’ Committee and other civil rights organizations, please click here.
Fox v. Vice
On June 6, 2011, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed an order that awarded attorney’s fees against a civil rights plaintiff because he had joined a frivolous federal claim with a clearly substantial claim under state law. The Court reiterated and amplified the standards for applying many federal civil rights statutes that contain provisions for fee shifting. If the plaintiff is the prevailing party, defendant must pay plaintiff’s reasonable attorney’s fees, and the defendant is entitled to fee shifting only if plaintiff’s claim is found to be frivolous. The Court declared that, when a plaintiff brings a case that a judge concludes contains both frivolous and non-frivolous claims, a defendant who prevails on the frivolous claims “may recover the reasonable attorney’s fees he expended solely because of the frivolous allegations. And that is all.” The Court instructed the lower courts that a defendant is “to receive only the portion of his fees that he would not have paid but for the frivolous claim.” [Italics added.] The opinion, authored by Justice Kagan, reversed a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit sustaining a lower court order that dismissed plaintiff’s federal claim as frivolous and remanded the state claims to state court for trial. The court awarded the defendants essentially all their fees, because the frivolous federal claim had been “the parties’ ‘focus’ in the litigation.” In holding this was error, the Supreme Court noted that the trial court’s order reflected that a portion of the time spent defending the federal claim was also necessary to defend the non-frivolous state law claims since the defendants’ attorneys’ work would be useful in the state-court proceedings. The Supreme Court declined to adopt a “bright-line” test that the Lawyers’ Committee and other amici proposed, that fees should never be shifted unless the entire litigation were found to be frivolous, but the Court adopted a rule very close to an alternative standard urged by amici, that a court order awarding fees to a defendant should “limit fees to those directly and exclusively spent defending against a frivolous federal claim.” Attorneys’ fee provisions apply in many claims brought under civil rights statutes, including employment discrimination lawsuits, and this ruling reinforces Congress’ intent of encouraging meritorious suits.
Click here for the Supreme Court’s opinion.
Click here to read the amicus curiae brief in support of Mr. Fox joined by the Lawyers’ Committee.
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion
On October 6, 2010, the Employment Discrimination Project filed an amicus curiae brief in the Supreme Court case of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, Docket No. 09-893. The case involves a challenge to a class action waiver in an arbitration agreement. While this specific case involves consumer rights, the issue has broad implications for employment cases. Arbitration agreements including class action waivers are becoming increasingly common in employment contracts and could severely limit the ability of workers to vindicate their statutory rights, including their rights to protection against employment discrimination. For that reason, the Lawyers’ Committee’s amicus brief in support of the Respondents argued that the FAA does not preempt state contract law. Our brief focused on the potential implications for employment cases, where class action waivers in arbitration agreements are becoming increasingly common and could severely limit the ability of workers to vindicate their statutory rights. To read the amicus brief filed by the Lawyers’ Committee and other advocacy groups, please click here. Unfortunately, on April 27, 2011, the Supreme Court issued a 5-4 decision that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does preempt states from determining that a class action waiver provision in an arbitration agreement is unconscionable under state law and thus unenforceable. To read the Supreme Court’s opinion and dissent, please click here.
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting
On September 8, 2010, the Lawyers’ Committee joined twelve prominent civil rights organizations in filing a friend-of-the-court brief in the Supreme Court case of Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, Docket No. 09-115. The case challenged the constitutionality of an Arizona anti-immigrant law known as the “Legal Arizona Workers Act.” The state law imposes sanctions, including loss of the right to do business in Arizona, on employers who employ unauthorized aliens and requires employers to use an electronic system to verify that employees are authorized to work. The civil rights organizations’ brief argued that the Arizona law is unconstitutional because it is preempted by federal immigration laws. Existing federal laws expressly prohibit any state or local law seeking to impose civil or criminal sanctions upon those who employ unauthorized aliens, except in the case of licensing laws. Additionally, Congress expressly made participation in the electronic verification system voluntary rather than mandatory, in an effort to avoid unlawful discrimination by employers against workers who are perceived as foreign or who may be incorrectly presumed to be unauthorized to work. The brief noted that the mandated electronic system is so unreliable that 18% of the workers initially found ineligible through the system are in fact eligible to work. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in a 5-3 decision on May 26, 2011, ruled that the Arizona law was not preempted, since the majority considered the right of a corporation to do business within the state to be a licensing law. The majority also decided that a state could mandate use of the electronic system because, although the statute affirmatively forbade the Secretary of Homeland Security from requiring employers to use the system, it did not forbid other authorities from requiring employers to use the system. In dissent, Justice Breyer cited documentation from the amicus brief joined by the Lawyers’ Committee, Click here for the Supreme Court’s decision. To read the amicus brief filed by the Lawyers’ Committee and other civil rights organizations, please click here.
Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics
On March 22, 2011, the Supreme Court declared that the anti-retaliation protections for employees objecting to violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (governing minimum wages and overtime) cover oral as well as written complaints. Kevin Kasten, who worked for Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics as an hourly-paid manufacturing and production worker from 2003 until 2006, verbally complained to his supervisors that the location of the employer’s time clocks prevented employees from being paid for time spent donning and doffing their required protective gear. Kasten alleges that he was terminated in retaliation for his verbal complaints. On June 23, 2010, the Lawyers’ Committee filed an amicus curiae brief in the Supreme Court, on behalf of itself and five other advocacy organizations, arguing that, contrary to the ruling below in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, employees making verbal objections to violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FSLA) are protected from retaliation. Although this case concerns the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA, the case will likely have implications for other statutes designed to protect workers from discrimination and other unlawful conduct. Click here for the Supreme Court’s decision. Click here to read the amicus brief filed by the Lawyers’ Committee and other advocacy organizations.
Staub v. Proctor Hospital
The Lawyers’ Committee participated in the matter of Staub v. Proctor Hospital as the writer of an amicus curiae brief joined by the AARP and Equal Justice Society in support of the petitioner, Vincent Staub. The case went to the Supreme Court after the Seventh Circuit rejected Staub’s legal argument as a “cat’s paw” case, meaning that “he sought to hold his employer liable for the animus of a supervisor who was not charged with making the ultimate employment decision.”h3In the brief, amici urged the Supreme Court to find that employers should be liable for biased actions of employees who act as agents of their employers in influencing or evaluating decisions of employment but do not render final decisions. On March 1, 2011 the unaimous Supreme Court found in favor of Mr. Staub. To read the Lawyers’ Committee’s amicus brief, please click here. To access the Supreme Court’s Opinion in this matter, please click here.
Dukes v. Wal-Mart
On March 1, 2011, the Lawyers’ Committee joined eight other organizations working to eradicate workplace discrimination in filing a friend-of-the-court brief in the Supreme Court case of Dukes v. Wal-Mart. The case is a nationwide class action on behalf of half a million women as potential class members, the largest employment discrimination class action in history. The class alleges that Wal-Mart pays women less than it pays men for performing the same jobs and that female employees receive fewer promotions and have to wait longer for those promotions than their male counterparts. On April 26, 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (en banc) affirmed class certification in this landmark case. (Opinion available here.) The Lawyers’ Committee played a leading role in filing a brief in this case in the Ninth Circuit on behalf of many amicus curiae in support of class certification. (Click here to read our 9th Circuit amicus brief.) Wal-Mart appealed this class certification decision to the Supreme Court on the grounds that the class is too large and diverse to be handled on a class action basis, and that back-pay remedies should not be included in a class action case. The amicus brief joined by the Lawyers Committee argues that class actions alleging claims, as here, of a pattern or practice of systemic discrimination and of disparate impact that adversely affects a protected class, play a vital role in enforcement of laws against discrimination in the workplace. The brief further argues that the female employees of Wal-Mart should be allowed to pursue their case as a class action to enable them to obtain appropriate remedies for broad-scale discrimination, particularly including back pay awards to make whole the many class members who suffered losses as a result of the discriminatory practices. To read the complete amicus brief filed by the Lawyers’ Committee and other civil rights organizations, please click here.
Thompson v. North American Stainless
On January 24, 2011, the Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision in Thompson v. North American Stainless, ruling that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from firing a worker in retaliation for another worker’s charge of discrimination. The Court ruled that Mr. Thompson, who claims he was fired because his fiancée filed a sex discrimination charge against their mutual employer, has the right to pursue a retaliation claim under Title VII. The Supreme Court’s decision overturns a Sixth Circuit Decision that Mr. Thompson did not have the right to sue alleging retaliation based on his fiancée’s actions since he had never himself engaged in protected activity under Title VII. The Lawyers’ Committee had joined anamicus brief filed in this case on behalf of a number of civil rights organizations, written by Michael Foreman, formerly the Lawyers’ Committee’s Deputy Director for Legal Programs, who is now a professor of law and director of the Civil Rights Appellate Clinic at Pennsylvania State University. The issue of retaliation based on another worker’s complaints of discrimination has become more critical with the increased participation of women in the labor market and can be particularly important in small towns where one employer dominates employment opportunities. Click here for the Supreme Court’s opinion. Click here to read the amicus curiaebrief in support of Mr. Thompson joined by the Lawyers’ Committee.
Rent-A-Center v. Jackson
On June 21, 2010, in Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, the Court extended its precedents favoring arbitration over federal courts by holding that an arbitrator should decide whether a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate claims under federal statutes that prohibit employment discrimination is unconscionable and thus unenforceable. Rent-A-Center moved to dismiss Antonio Jackson’s employment discrimination complaint in federal court on the ground that the claim was subject to mandatory arbitration. Jackson asserted that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and that the Ninth Circuit ruled that the court should decide that threshold issue. The Project’s amicus curiae brief urged the Supreme Court to uphold the Ninth Circuit’s decision limiting the scope of arbitration, but the Supreme Court reversed. Click here to read the brief. Click here to read the Supreme Court’s decision.
Lewis v. City of Chicago
On May 24, 2010, the Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision in Lewis v. City of Chicago, ruling that employers can be held liable each time they use the results of a discriminatory test. Between 1996 and 2002, the City of Chicago relied on the results of a test that disproportionately excluded African American applicants from firefighter positions. The City relied on the test results to hire eleven disproportionately white firefighter classes. The Lewis plaintiffs filed their charges of discrimination when they city made hiring decisions on the basis of the discriminatory test. The City argued that the Title VII claims were time-barred because the claims were not filed within 300 days after the City first announced its hiring plan. The Court rejected the City’s argument and concluded that the plaintiffs’ claims were timely. Click here for the Supreme Court’s decision. Click here to read the amicus brief that the Lawyers’ Committee filed with the National Partnership for Women and Families and the National Women’s Law Center.
Ricci v. DeStefano
The EDP filed an amicus curiae brief in Ricci v. DeStefano which could be one of the most important and far-reaching cases of this Supreme Court Term, because it could involve the Court’s examination and reconsideration not only of its longstanding precedents regarding private sector affirmative action, but also the underlying disparate impact theory first set forth in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. Click here to see our brief in this matter.
14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett
The U.S. Supreme Court, in 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, determines that a union’s collective bargaining agreement requiring arbitration for employment discrimination disputes may supplant the member’s substantive rights to have claim heard in federal court. Read the brief EDP filed in support of the employees who attempted to resolve their age discrimination complaints in federal court when their union would not arbitrate their claims as required under the collective bargaining agreement. Click here for the brief. Click here to see U.S. Supreme Court’s slip opinion published on March 31, 2009.
